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ARGUMENT 
Appellee's "Summary of Argument" at page 23 of Appellee's Brief states that: 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in handling discovery issues. 
It can order that no discovery be had or that discovery be conducted on a 
limited basis. In this case, the Appellant had the ability to secure the 
documents and information she claims she needed simply by taking the 
deposition of the court appointed independent custody evaluator. She 
failed to do so. That failure cannot in any way equate to a claim of error 
on the part of the trial court. [Emphasis added.] 
Appellee's "Argument" at page 23 of Appellee's Brief states that: 
Both the children's therapist and their guardian ad litem felt that disclosure 
of all of the information which fell within the ambit of the [discovery] 
request could have damaging effects on the children, if disclosed, and 
subsequently unscrupulously used. Each filed an affidavit to that effect 
and the father filed a Motion for Protective Order. 
REPLY 
SYNOPSIS OF ARGUMENT 
This case is one of careful concealment of data, investigations, out of court statements, 
and specific mental defect allegations upon which Appellant was accused of 
constituting an immediate and specific danger to her children. Such allegations are false 
and concealment of all underlying data upon which such allegations were based is a 
fundamental violation of Appellant's rights. 
Appellant attempted discovery of the underlying data on several occasions. 
The Brief of Appellant, "Statement of Facts," paragraph 36, states that on 
December 30, 1997, a Request for Production of Documents was served upon both 
opposing counsel and the Guardian ad Litem, requesting the following: 
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all medical, psychological, social work summaries, reports, synopsis of 
any document received from any source, ... 
all of your communications from to or by or between you and Primary 
Children's Medical Center or any of its officers, agents or employees, ... 
all of your communications by or between you and the office of Guardian 
ad Litem. 
In response to that Request both the opposing counsel and the Guardian ad 
Litem stated that, nWe don't have any." [Emphasis added.] See paragraphs 43, 44, and 
46 of Brief of Appellant "Statement of Facts." Appellant's Statement of Facts as to that 
question was not disputed. 
Quoted again, at page 26, the Brief of Appellee states that: 
Both the children's therapist and their Guardian ad Litem felt that 
disclosure of all of the information which fell within the ambit of the 
request could have damaging effects on the children, if disclosed, and 
subsequently unscrupulously used. Each filed an affidavit to that effect. 
REPLY TO APPELLEES BRIEF 
POINT 1 
A total discovery lockout cannot be maintained upon nothing more than an 
unsupported claim that discovery may not be helpful or in the interests of children. 
The question now before the Court of Appeals is may opposing counsel, by 
providing partial, insufficient, concealed, misleading and false information to the Court 
obtain an Order totally preventing discovery of information upon which the Appellant 
was accused? 
If neither Guardian ad Litem nor Appellee never had "any communications" with 
any employee or agent at IHC, how is it possible for Appellee's counsel to prepare 
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affidavits for both the IHC Social Worker and an Affidavit for the Guardian ad Litem 
stating that, 
6. It is my legal and professional opinion, that it would not be in the 
children's best interest to release these medical records at this time. 
Furthermore, I do not believe the release of these records would be 
helpful. 
7. I absolutely believe a Protective Order should enter preventing the 
release of these records in the release of the records (sic) at this time 
could be harmful to the children by causing past issues to have to be 
relived. (See Record, pages 761 et seq.) 
Appellant's Request for Production of Documents was not for information or 
documents that may constitute or consist of the "work-product" of the office of 
Guardian ad Litem. The question was—What documents and communications had you 
had, do you have now or have you seen from the IHC Social Worker, Ms. Hardman, or 
other members of the IHC "Child Protection Team?" 
Given the response from both Guardian ad Litem and from Appellee and his 
counsel that, "We don't have any."; how is it possible to prepare and execute an 
Affidavit as to date, records and documents that one has never seen, heard of or know 
any of the contents thereof? 
POINT 2 
Affidavits that make nothing more than conclusionary statements of "experts" or 
guardian ad litem are not sufficient. 
At a minimum, such a result violates the principles set forth by Mr. Justice 
Zimmerman in ButterfieId v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). Even in an affidavit of an 
expert, giving an expert opinion, the affidavit is insufficient when only conclusionary in 
nature. The affidavits were fundamentally flawed and infirm. The Protective Order 
prohibiting discovery was improperly obtained. 
L 
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Under Butterfield v. Okubo, it was established that, "Utah is not alone in 
requiring experts' affidavits to include supporting factual basis for their opinions." 
In the present case the question of why could never be asked. Why is release of 
any data damaging to the children? Why should Appellant and other medical experts 
be prohibited from review of the data upon which Appellant stands accused? Why? 
The unsupported conclusion of any expert standing alone on concealed data is 
not sufficient to find an accused at fault in a court of law. Why? Because the result is 
the establishment of a court of star-chamber and conviction based upon secret affidavit 
and report of undisclosed out of court declarants not subject to review. 
POINT 3 
Appellee's retort that Appellant is at fault for not taking the formal deposition of Dr. 
Gully is without merit. 
w 
How can the deposition be taken of a medical professional when no records are 
available and none may be produced in response to the deposition notice? Stated in 
another manner—When a protective order has been issued prohibiting an expert from 
producing or disclosing any data upon which his or her opinion is based—How is it 
possible to conduct the deposition? Any Notice of Deposition Duces Tecum is 
prohibited by a broad and unlimited protective order. 
The Protective Order obtained by opposing counsel from the trial court 
prohibited the release of any and all information—all records, interviews, accusations, 
data, and documents—upon which the court-appointed expert based his opinion. The 
exceptionally broad and unlimited Protective Order effectively disabled the Appellant's 
attempts to meet and confront her accusers. 
Under the provisions of Rule 706(a), "Court-appointed experts," deals hopefully 
with the appointment of independent experts. Please note that the Protective Order in 
question was prepared by opposing counsel, prohibiting access to any data underlying 
the court-appointed expert's opinion. 
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One may not have the whole pie. One may not have the cake and eat it too. One 
may not consume both the whole pie and the cake and then obtain a Protective Order to 
conceal the crumbs. In this present matter a Protective Order was issued and upheld by 
the trial court. That Protective Order effectively prohibited discovery. That Protective 
Order was obtained on nothing more than release of any records would be damaging to 
the children. Based upon that, opposing counsel used the Protective Order to prohibit 
discovery of any kind and to greatly accelerate the rising cost. Greatly accelerating the 
cost is another strategy of prohibition of discovery—a very effective strategy. 
Suppose that a Notice had been issued to take the deposition of the only person 
in possession of the medical records of this case. How does one even commence to ask 
questions? 
Question? Was the client sick? 
Answer Yes. 
Question? What data did you rely upon in making that diagnosis? 
OBJECTION - Opposing Counsel - The court's Protective Order prevents 
disclosure of any underlying data! 
Whereupon the deposition terminated. 
Therein lies this entire case. May a person be accused and found at fault by 
independent interviews of witnesses outside of the trial court, having no access to the 
information or data provided or available to the out-of-court interviewer? 
In this present case the veracity of all information provided to the single 
appointed expert, prohibited that data being provided to anyone else. The improperly 
obtained Protective Order and expansion of that Order to include all information upon 
which the Appellant stood accused constituted a violation of Appellant's rights and 
constituted reversible error. 
Appellant was prevented from and prohibited from preparing for trial. No 
competent medical expert, whether retained by the Appellant or not, would give an 
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opinion without access to the medical records available. In this case the Protective 
Order prohibited any medical history or present data from being available to any other 
medical provider, psychologist, psychological team or psychiatrists. 
However the trial court was persuaded to get there, the result violates 
fundamental rights of freedom, due process, right to confront accusers, all the basic 
principles upon which the laws of this exceptional nation stands. 
CONCLUSION 
Even the trial court itself finally had to acknowledge that no argument could be 
maintained against having Dr. Rindflesh review of all information under the terms and 
conditions suggested. 
Similarly, the previously issued orders, which prohibited access to Rosie, her 
counsel, and her psychologists, were likewise indefensible. But even the apparent 
deference of the trial court toward the "protection of children" put forth in Appellant's 
arguments the trial court had to finally give way to the recognition that its actions could 
not support the denial of Rosie's Motion in Limine. 
Surprisingly, on the morning of trial, the trial court's order, given just five (5) 
working days earlier, was seen as a sham. Reasonable time to comply with the trial 
court's order was denied. The trial was forced forward. 
Permitting Dr. Mark A. Rindflesh, MD, an eminent psychiatrist, to review the 
present matter would have given the trial court an exceptional opportunity to bring the 
best evidence and expertise available. The Vitae and Affidavits of Dr. Rindflesh are a 
matter of record. 
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Dr. Rindflesh is presently a member of the University of Utah Neuropsychiatric 
Institute. Having graduated from the University of Utah School of Medicine in 1973, his 
postgraduate training included a Residency in Child Psychiatry, and a General 
Psychiatry Residency. He has both clinical and forensic experience, and has provided 
professional advice and consultation to the Utah judiciary in the past. 
A total denial of discovery and direct and intentional failure to permit access to 
any of the underlying data upon which Appellant was accused constitutes reversible 
error, violates the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Utah Rules of Evidence, is a denial 
of Due Process and places the motives, intent and purpose of the trial court and its 
judges in question. 
RFTJFFSOTICHT 
WHEREFORE, Appellant seeks relief as follows: 
1. Reverse and remand, establishing the status quo between the parties 
which existed between the parties before Appellee filed his petition for modification of 
the original divorce decree; 
2. An order that Appellant and/or her counsel and medical advisors have 
access to all records of any kind and nature related to this matter, including but not 
limited to all IHC information, documents, and data (to be broadly interpreted as set 
forth in the unanswered Request for Production directed to both Appellee and the 
office of Guardian ad Litem.); 
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3. Specifically directing that Appellant's counsel, her psychologists and 
psychiatrist have unlimited access to all IHC records which are in any manner related to 
Appellant, Appellee or their children; 
4. Specifically directing that Appellant's counsel, her psychologists and 
psychiatrist have unlimited access to all records of Guardian ad Litem which are in any 
manner related to Appellant, Appellee or her children, the only exception being such 
matters as the Guardian ad Litem may clearly establish as its own independent work 
product, full disclosure of what such work product may constitute, and disclosure to 
the trial court of a detailed statement of why such must remain secret and undisclosed; 
5. That the trial court assign the cases to other judges for further 
disposition; and 
6. Such other and further relief as the court may deem appropriate. 
>nd DATED: this 22 a day of June 1999. 
MARTIN & NELSON, PC 
Counsel for Appellant 
'S^^te 
Ltaen D. Martir/ 
ttorney at Law 
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